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Abandonment and Forfeiture
of Coal Leases in Kentucky
INTRODUCTION
The importance of the coal industry to the economies of
Kentucky and the United States is obvious. It is one of Kentucky's
most vital industries,' and is widely viewed as an energy source
which in years to come will help decrease American dependence
on foreign oil.2 The coal lease plays a major role in the develop-
ment of coal properties; through the lease, owners who are un-
able to mine can transfer mineral rights to lessees who have the
present capacity and resources to extract the mineral. 3
This development scenario, however, is interrupted when a
lessee either ceases to mine or operates in a manner prohibited by
the lease. In the first instance, no mineral is produced, the lessor
receives no royalty and the outstanding lease becomes an encum-
brance on the lessor's title and an impediment to the execution of
a later lease to one who will mine. In the second instance, some
coal probably is produced, but in all likelihood, coal that should
be mined is not extracted or is damaged so as to be rendered un-
mineable in the future. The lessor does not receive the royalty he
or she should, and the property is not developed to the fullest ex-
tent possible. In both instances, development is impeded.
• To deal with these situations of inadequate coal develop-
ment, courts have applied the concepts of abandonment and for-
feiture as a means by which lessors may recover leaseholds.
"Abandonment" is the "[v]oluntary relinquishment of all right,
title, claim and possession, with the intention of not reclaiming
it."4 "Forfeiture," on the other hand, is the loss of a right "by the
1 In 1981, 157.5 million tons of coal were produced by Kentucky mines. In fact,
Kentucky has been the leading coal-producing state in the nation for the past nine years.
Mueller, State's No. 1 Ranking in Coal is Threatened, Lexington Herald, Sept. 21, 1982,
at 1, col. 5.
2 3 DEPT. OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REP. TO
CONGRESS xii (1980).
3 See Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (Ky. 1934) (a coal lease is a convey-
ance of absolute title to such minerals under the surface).
4 BLAoCs LAW DICTIONARY 2 (5th ed. 1979).
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commission of a crime or fault or the losing of something by way
of penalty." The difference, therefore, between the two prin-
ciples is that one is a voluntary relinquishment by the lessee and
the other is not. Despite this basic distinction, abandonment and
forfeiture, as applied to coal leases in Kentucky, are often treated
as synonyms,5 or an action for one is brought when an action for
the other is proper. 7 This confusion has its roots in early decisions
by Kentucky's highest court, which used the words "abandon-
ment" and "forfeiture" almost interchangeably.' This Note,
recognizing at its outset the basic distinction between the two
principles, will attempt to present Kentucky law as to abandon-
ment and forfeiture of coal leases. 9
I. ABANDONMENT OF COAL LEASES
Kentucky courts adhere to the rule that abandonment "con-
sists of two elements: 1) voluntary, actual relinquishment of pos-
session, and 2) intent to repudiate ownership."' 10 The party as-
serting abandonment has the burden of proving "the same by
clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence."' This rule for deter-
5 Id. at 584.
6 See Nally v. Edwards, 279 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. 1955). Edwards asserted that Nally
and another had abandoned and forfeited their interests.
7 See Reis v. Norton Coal Corp., 346 S.W.2d 8 (Ky. 1961). The Court held that the
lessee had not abandoned the lease. The lessor elected not to proceed under the forfeiture
clause of the lease. Id. at 9.
8 See, e.g., Eastern Ky. Mineral & Timber Co. v. Swann-Day Lumber Co., 146
S.W. 438 (Ky. 1912). At one point in its opinion, the Court stated that the lessees had a
duty to begin mining "within a reasonable time under pain of forfeiture or abandonment
[of] the development of the estate granted." Id. at 442.
9 The Kentucky courts have generally treated oil and gas leases and coal leases sim-
ilarly with respect to abandonment and forfeiture; however, some discrepancies do exist
due to basic differences in the physical properties of the two classes of minerals. For an
overview of the Kentucky law on abandonment and forfeiture of oil and gas leases, see
Cameron v. Lebow, 338 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1960), aff'd on other grounds, 366 S.W.2d 164
(Ky. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 394 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. 1965). Kentucky courts have not
made any legal distinction between coal leases and leases for other hard minerals.
10 Ellis v. McCormack, 218 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Ky. 1949) (citing I AM. Jut. Abandon-
ment § 8, 14 (1948)).
11 Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Allen, 324 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Ky. 1959); Cameron v.
Lebow, 366 S.W.2d at 164. See notes 19-21 infra and accompanying text for a discussion
of Cameron.
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mining abandonment would appear fairly straightforward, lend-
ing itself to ease of application. In fact, the first element rarely
presents a problem.12 Either the lessee is on the property mining,
or preparing to mine, or is not. However, courts have had diffi-
culty with the second element, intention to abandon. This dif-
ficulty is not surprising, because proof of intention involves the
proof of a state of mind, which often can be proven only by cir-
cumstantial evidence. Over the years, the Kentucky courts have
recognized several examples of circumstantial evidence which in-
dicate an intent on the part of the lessee to abandon the coal
lease.
The most obvious indication of intent to abandon is lengthy
continued absence. In Ellis v. McCormack,', the Court stated
that "[1]apse of a long time after relinquishment of possession is
significant evidence of the intention to abandon."'1 In Ellis, the
Court held that the lessee had abandoned the property and coal
he had actually mined, because he had sold most of his mining
equipment to the lessor and did not assert ownership for seven
years.' 5 In United Mining Co. v. Morton,' the Court held that
the plaintiff's five-year absence co~istituted an abandonment of
his interest.'
The question arises as to how long a time must pass before
the lessee can be held to have abandoned the lease. In Kentucky,
this question has no answer. The courts have consistently stated
that "[m]ere lapse of time and nonuser [sic], unaccompanied by
any other evidence showing intention,' 7 are not enough to con-
stitute an abandonment.' This rule was carried to an outrageous
1 2 The lessees absence may present an issue when the lessee is not mining the partic-
ular leasehold, but rather is mining an adjacent tract of land. See Drake v. Black Di-
amond Coal Mining Co., 279 S.W. 952 (Ky. 1926) (lessee held not to have abandoned be-
cause of intent to mine the coal through mine shafts on adjacent property).
13 218 S.W.2d at 391.
14 Id. at 392. The Court had earlier stated that it was possible to infer intention from
relinquishment of possession "where the facts justify it." Id. It would seem that the only
situation in which this inference is justifiable is when the lessee has been absent for a long
period of time.
15 In a similar case, the Court held that the lessee had not abandoned the property
where the absence had been a mere eight months. Nally v. Edwards, 279 S.W.2d at 251.
16 192 S.W. 79 (Ky. 1917).
17 Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Allen, 324 S.W.2d at 830.
18 See Rice v. Rice, 50 S.W.2d 26,30 (Ky. 1932).
1982-83]
*KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71
extreme in Cameron v. Lebow19 in which the lessee was held not
to have abandoned an oil and gas lease, 20 even though the lessee
had not developed the property for more than sixteen years. The
Court apparently reached this result because no evidence existed,
other than the passage of time, which indicated an abandon-
ment.2 1 Since lapse of time alone does not show an intent to aban-
don, it is necessary to ascertain other "facts and circumstances"
which will prompt a court to rule that a coal lease has been aban-
doned.22
In Kentucky Coke Co. v. Smith,25 cessation of work in addi-
tion to the passage of time led the Court to hold that the lessee
had abandoned the lease. However, the Court devoted much of
its opinion to the lessee's argument that the lessor had given no
notice of an intention to have the lease forfeited for failure to de-
velop.4 The Court also spoke of the enforceability of unilateral,
executory contracts;25 some doubt exists as to whether the Court
cancelled the lease because it had been abandoned or because it
was an unenforceable, unilateral contract.2 However, the Court
stated:
The rule with respect to cesser of work after operations be-
gun [sic] is much the same with respect to coal leases as with oil
19 366 S.W.2d at 164.
20 The Kentucky courts have applied the same rules in abandonment cases whether
the lease was for coal or for oil and gas.
2 The Court refused to find abandonment despite an earlier statement in the opin-
ion that "in view of the nature and purpose of an oil and gas lease and the practical neces-
sities for expeditious development, the fact of abandonment may be more readily found
than in other legal relationships." Id. at 165. In light of this statement and the Court's
finding that the lease had not been abandoned, the present usefulness of the doctrine of
abandonment to recapture a coal leasehold must be seriously questioned.
' Abandonment is "to be determined in each case upon the surrounding facts and
circumstances." Id. at 166. See Browning v. Cavanaugh, 300 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Ky. 1957);
Rice v.-Rice, 50 S.W.2d at 30.
23 269 S.W. 558 (Ky. 1925).
24 Id. at 559. Here, again, the confusion as to the principles of abandonment and for-
feiture is evident. See text accompanying notes 69-84 infra for a discussion of the require-
ment of notice as a condition precedent to forfeiture.
25 See notes 71 & 72 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Kentucky
rule as to the cancellation of unilateral, executory coal leases.
'2 269 S.W. at 560. "When the mining ceased, the consideration ceased, and either
party was, under the terms of the lease, entitled to abandon it at pleasure, because it was
not enforceable against either." Id.
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and gas leases. "Cesser of work will operate as a termination of
a lease by abandonment, especially where the first or second
well proves to be a dry one. Thus, where a lease was for 15
years, and as much longer as oil or gas is found in paying quan-
tities, and the lessee erected a 'rig', drilled a test well, but ob-
tained no oil, and thereupon removed the machinery used in
drilling, leaving nothing but a wooden tank, which rotted, as-
serting no title to the premises for nine years," it was held that
the lease had been abandoned .... 27
In Kentucky Coke, the lessee had mined for fifteen years but
ceased, and the leasehold lay unworked for more than twenty
years. This period of inactivity in addition to the cessation of
work clearly indicated an intention to abandon the coal lease.s2
Another indication of an intent to abandon is the declaration
of the lessee. In Rice v. Rice,2 the Court found that a letter from
the lessee to the lessor manifested an intention to abandon the
coal lease.30 The Court held:
His letter, together with his actions showing the absence on his
part of any attention to, interest or concern in, the lease and
the operations thereunder, are sufficient to authorize the con-
clusion that he had abandoned the lease prior to the time [the
lessor] re-entered and took possession of the premises, and that
[the lessee] had no intention of again resuming operation of the
mine and the development of the lease.3 '
Such declarations of the lessee are more reliable evidence of in-
tention than are passage of time or cessation of work. The mo-
ment the lessee sent the letter, he had abandoned the lease.3 2
27 Id. (citing I THORNTON, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 262 (1918)).
28 269 S.W. at 558. A more recent case in which the lessees cessation of operation
was held to result in abandonment is Browning v. Cavanaugh, 300 S.W.2d at 580 (aban-
donment of an oil and gas lease).
29 50 S.W.2d at 26.
30 According to the opinion, the lessee proposed in the letter that:
[1]f [the lessor] would prepare a lease for the property covered by the present
lease, making its terms such that he could afford to develop the mine, and at
a price that he could afford to mine the coal for market, he [the lessee]
"would arrange to get the plant started without any delay and do everything
to make the mine and property worth while."
Id. at 29.
31 Id.
32 The Court stated that Ii]n the case of true abandonment the lessees title is gone
1982-83]
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Termination of corporate existence also indicates an inten-
tion to abandon a coal lease. Although Kentucky does not follow
the common law rule that a corporation's dissolution automat-
ically extinguishes a lease to the corporation,33 such dissolution in
combination with other circumstances, such as the passage of
time and removal of equipment, may result in an abandonment.
In Barrowman Coal Corp. v. Kentland Coal & Coke Co.,," the
Court was satisfied that the stockholders of the corporate lessee
had abandoned the lease on the basis of facts similar to those set
forth above. As a practical matter, finding intention to aban-
don because of termination of corporate existence has limited ap-
plication since corporations may be perpetual in existence,e and
few corporate charters have express termination dates.
One important situation exists in which the lessee will not be
held to have abandoned the lease. No abandonment will be
found in Kentucky where the lessee continues "to pay minimum
royalties in a substantial amount."7 The West Virginia Supreme
Court reached the same result in the recent decision of lafolla v.
Douglas Pocahontas Coal Corp.-" That court qualified its ruling
by stating: "We can envisage a situation in which a contract of
this nature might, by virtue of changed circumstances unforeseen
by either of the contracting parties become 'so unfair and uneven
as to render its enforcement equivalent to the perpetration of
fraud upon the lessors."' 39
Kentucky would appear to be in line with this statement by
the minute he determines to give up the property and does some act in pursuance to that
intention." Id. at 30. In fact, in Rice, the lessee had only had possession of the lease a little
over three years when he wrote the letter to the lessor. Contra Ellis v. Brown, 177 F.2d
677 (6th Cir. 1949) (declaration of lessee that he "didn't want any part of it" held not to
manifest an intention to abandon).
33 Shadoin v. Sellars, 4 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Ky. 1928).
34 196 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. 1946).
3 The corporation's charter expired, the mining equipment was removed and the
stockholders of the corporation did not exert ownership over the property for two years.
Id. at 430-31.
36 Ky. REV. STAT. § 271A.270(1)(b) (Bobbs-Merrill 1972).
3 See Reis v. Norton Coal Corp., 346 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Ky. 1961). The Court stated,
"We can find no basis for an implication of an intent to abandon on the part of a lessee
who is continuing to pay substantial minimum royalties." Id.
38 250 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1979).
39 Id. at 133 (quoting Lawther Oil Co. v. Guffey, 43 S.E. 101, 102 (1902)).
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the West Virginia court, as evidenced by the words "substantial
minimum royalties" found in the opinion of Reis v. Norton Coal
Corp." However, Kentucky also adheres to a rule that consider-
ation as little as one dollar per acre is sufficient to make a con-
tract enforceable,4 so that as long as the lessee pays the mininum
royalty provided in the lease, the lessee cannot be said to have
manifested an intention to abandon the lease.
If a lessee does abandon the lease, the lessor has two rem-
edies. First, the lessor may re-enter and take possession of the
premises. In Eastern Kentucky Mineral & Timber Co. v. Swann-
Day Lumber Co. ,42 responding to the lessee's argument that the
lessor's remedy was to bring suit for specific performance or for
cancellation of the lease, the Court stated:
[Tihe grantor may re-enter and take possession of the premises
as if no conveyance had been executed. There is no sound
reason why he may not peaceably obtain possession of his
property without resorting to other remedies given by the law.
He has the right to peaceably and quietly do that which the
judgment of the court would give him the right to do. His entry
does not prejudice the rights of the grantee; as, if it is wrong-
ful, he may be successfully proceeded against as a trespasser. 43
The second remedy of the lessor is an action for cancellation of
the lease which will remove the encumbrance on the title to the
property. The lessor cannot demand damages if he or she seeks
cancellation of the lease. 44
II. ABANDONMENT DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COAL
In several cases, Kentucky's highest court has spoken of the
40 See 346 S.W.2d at 9.
41 See L.E. Cooke Corp. v. Hayes, 549 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), appeal dis-
missed, 572 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1978). The court stated that "[wihere consideration is good
and sufficient (and one dollar per acre per year is) then rights relative to termination may
be expressly contracted by either party without bringing such instruments under the uni-
lateral rule." Id. at 838. See also Cleveland Wrecking Co. v. Aetna Oil Co., 154 S.W.2d
31 (Ky. 1941).
42 146 S.W. at 438.431Id. at 443.
44 See Baltimore Trust Co. v. Norton Coal Mining Co., 25 F. Supp. 968, 972 (W.D.
Ky. 1939). The court stated that "under well recognized authorities the complain-
ant... could not ask a cancellation of the lease and at the same time claim royalties." Id.
1982-83]
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abandonment of a lease due to the exhaustion of coal underlying
the property.4 However, these cases did not concern the volun-
tary relinquishment of possession accompanied by an intention to
give up the claim and right of property. Rather, the leases in-
volved in these cases contained specific provisions providing for
the termination of the lease due to the exhaustion of a certain
quantity and quality of coal. In other words, the controversies
arose from the terms of the lease.
The rule developed from this line of cases is that "[t]he ex-
haustion of the minable [sic] coal in the land must... be held to
have the effect of terminating the contract."4" Clearly, the lease
controls as to whether the coal for which the parties contracted
has been mined. The issues in the cases stem from a condition
placed on the quality of coal to be mined, such as "all mineable
and merchantable coal." The court's interpretation of this condi-
tion determines whether the lessee is still obligated to the lessor.47
4 See, e.g., Hall v. Eversole's Adm'r, 64 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1933); Auxier Coal Co. v.
Big Sandy & Millers Creek Coal Co., 238 S.W. 189 (Ky. 1922); Tichenor v. McHenry
Coal Co., 215 S.W. 799 (Ky. 1919).
46 Auxier Coal Co. v. Big Sandy & Millers Creek Coal Co., 238 S.W. at 191. The
Court further stated that "[a]ny other construction would be unjust and would violate the
proclaimed purpose of the lease." Id.
47 See, e.g., Howard v. Hi Hat Elkhorn Mining Co., 295 F.2d 81, 82 (6th Cir. 1961)
(lease obligation limited to the mining of "mineable and marketable coal;" lessee not obli-
gated to lessor); Oates v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 248 F.2d 388 (6th Cir. 1957) (per
curlam) (coal found to be unmarketable); Walter Bledsoe & Co. v. Elkhorn Land Co.,
219 F.2d 556, 558 (6th Cir. 1955) (there was "merchantable and mineable coal in the
property at the time the lease was purchased"); Kentucky & W. Va. Coal & Mining Co. v.
Blue Diamond Coal Co., 106 F. Supp. 274, 277 (E.D. Ky. 1952) (preponderance of the
evidence established there was no "mineable and merchantable coal" underlying the
leased premises; lessee entitled to declare lease terminated); Martin's Fork Coal Co. v.
Harlan-Wallins Coal Corp., 14 F. Supp. 902,908 (E.D. Ky. 1934), affid, 83 F.2d 967 (6th
Cir. 1936) (the undertaking of the lessee to mine and pay royalty on all "workable and
merchantable coal" on the leased premises was limited to coal that could be mined and
sold at a profit under ordinary or average conditions); Browning v. Mountain States Coal
Corp., 338 S.W.2d 200 (Ky. 1960) (lessee held obligated to pay minimum royalty on mer-
chantable coal despite falling coal market); Wince Block Coal Co. v. Evans, 76 S.W.2d
241, 244 (Ky. 1934) (exhaustion of "workable and marketable coal" entitled lessee to ter-
minate lease and discontinue the payment of minimum royalties); Hall v. Eversole's
Adm'r, 64 S.W.2d at 891 (lessee held obligated to pay minimum royalty on merchantable
coal); Powers v. Mahan-Jellico Coal Co., 51 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Ky. 1932) (lessee did not
have unqualified and arbitrary right to abandon and cancel the lease under provision of
lease as to "faulty or irregular coal"); Laurence E. Tierney Land Co. v. Kingston-Poca-
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An exception to the rule that the lessee is not liable for the
minimum royalty if the coal has been exhausted arises when the
lessee retains possession of the leased property. In Gambill's Ad-
ministrator v. Ellser Coal Co.,4 the Court stated that "even
where the coal is exhausted, the lessee is not released from liabil-
ity for the fixed rental or royalty based on minimum production
if he retains possession of the premises for some purpose under
the lease . . . , although the purpose for which it is retained is
not a mining purpose." 49 However, the lessee will not be liable
for the minimum royalty, even if he retains possession of the
property, if the lease itself prescribes that no minimum royalty
should be paid in such a case.o
III. FORFEITURE OF COAL LEASES
Like abandonment due to exhaustion of coal, forfeiture of a
mineral lease will arise, if at all, under the terms of the lease. In
fact, the Kentucky courts follow the well-established rule that
"no forfeiture will be decreed for a breach of the terms of a lease
in the absence of a forfeiting clause.' 51 The reason for this rule is
hontas Coal Co., 43 S.W.2d 517 (Ky. 1931) (lessee held obligated to pay royalty on mine-
able coal).
A complete analysis of the term "mineable and merchantable coal" is beyond the
scope of this Note.
4 8 20 S.W. 2d 286 (Ky. 1929).
49 Id. at 287 (citations omitted). Accord Saylor v. Howard, 18 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Ky.
1929) ("[rloyalties contracted to be paid the lessor for the use of coal property are regarded
in this state as rents").
o See Hall v. Landrum, 470 S.W.2d 830, 831-32 (Ky. 1971).
51 Continental Fuel Co. v. Haden, 206 S.W. 8, 10 (Ky. 1918). See also Duff v. Duff,
265 S.W. 305, 306 (Ky. 1924); Ross v. Sheldon, 119 S.W. 225, 228 (Ky. 1909). In a case
where the lease does not contain a forfeiture clause, the lessor's remedy is a common law
action for damages. 265 S.W. at 306. Although the lease may not be forfeited, the lessee
still has a duty of reasonable compliance with the terms of the lease. 119 S.W. at 228. But
see Eastern Ky. Mineral & Timber Co. v. Swann-Day Lumber Co., 146 S.W. at 438.
That Court stated:
We will read into the contract such terms and conditions as the contract and
the circumstances surrounding its execution warrant us in assuming were in
the minds of the parties when it was entered into. So interpreting it, we are
well satisfied that it should be read as if there had been inserted in it, in apt
terms, a condition imposing upon the grantees the duty of beginning within
a reasonable time under pain of forfeiture ....
Id. at 442.
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that "[florfeitures are not favored either at law or in equity. A
forfeiture from its nature implies the taking away from one of
some pre-existing right, and this the courts will never do unless
the equities of the situation are such there is no way to avoid it."52
Although disfavored, forfeiture clauses in mineral leases are
enforceable.0 Yet "courts are always slow and reluctant to de-
clare or enforce a forfeiture, and in the interpretation of a forfei-
ture clause in a contract will strictly construe it against the party
who has invoked it and claims the right of forfeiture." Forfei-
tures have been found for failure to pay the minimum royalties
required by the terms of the lease,rs for failure to mine coal for a
period of six months,O for failure to commence mining oper-
ations "within a reasonable time,"5 for permitting the property
to lay idle for thirty successive days,0s for failure to commence
52 Hoggv. Forsythe, 248 S.W. 1008, 1011 (Ky. 1923).
53 E.g., Wender Blue Gem Coal Co. v. Louisville Property Co., 125 S.W. 732 (Ky.
1910). This Court enforced the forfeiture clause only after reviewing the surrounding cir-
cumstances in order to justify terminating the lease. Id. at 735.
54 See Hogg v. Forsythe, 248 S.W. at 1011. The court in Hogg added that "the forfei-
ture will not be declared except under the strict and literal terms of the instrument." Id.
See also Langford v. Hughes, 214 S.W.2d 1011, 1012-13 (Ky. 1948); Addison v. Branden-
burg, 260 S.W. 381, 385 (Ky. 1924).
55 See, e.g., Gorman v. Lusk, 109 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1937) (lease provided that the
lessee was not required to pay the minimum royalty in the event of a riot; as lessee did not
pay because of a strike, the lease was held to have been forfeited); Union Gas & Oil Co. v.
Wright, 255 S.W. 697 (Ky. 1923) (lessee failed to tender minimum royalties until several
days after period for payment had expired); Blue Ridge Coal Co. v. Hurst, 244 S.W. 892
(Ky. 1922) (lease held forfeited although failure to pay minimum royalty was due to the
fact that the mine could not be operated profitably because of government price ceilings
on coal); Wender Blue Gem Coal Co. v. Louisville Property Co., 125 S.W. at 732 (min-
imum royalty long past due, lessee insolvent, profitability of the mine speculative, and
various liens asserted against the property).
* See Marcum v. Brock, 257 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. 1953).
7 Johnson v. Everidge, 308 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. 1957). The lease had been executed on
March 16, 1955. As the lessees had not commenced mining by September 6, 1955, the les-
sors asserted that the lease had been forfeited. The trial court allowed the lessees until July
15, 1956, to begin mining. The lessees did not comply. In holding the lease forfeited, the
Court of Appeals stated that "[under the circumstances peculiar to this case the [lessees]
were given a full measure of (and perhaps more than) 'a reasonable time' to begin mining
operations." Id. at 434-35.
58 See Trumbo v. Persons, 118 S.W. 916 (Ky. 1909).
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mining within twelve months 9 and for failure to diligently
mine. 0
These last five situations in which the lessee was held to have
forfeited the lease involved the breach of an express covenant to
mine diligently. 6' However, the Court has sometimes held that a
coal lessee is subject to implied covenants. A lease in which no
minimum rental is set out62 and which contains no express cov-
enant to mine diligently carries implied covenants, on the part of
the lessee, to mine diligently," or to begin development within a
reasonable time. 4 This obligation, although implied, "is as much
'9 See Kentucky Diamond Mining & Developing Co. v. Sellars, 136 S.W. 1016 (Ky.
1911) (forfeiture implied because no attempt was made to comply with the terms of the
agreement for 24 years).
60 See North Star Co. v. Howard, 341 S.W.2d 251,254 (Ky. 1960).
61 A typical coal lease will contain many express covenants on the part of the lessee.
Common covenants require the lessee to comply with all applicable laws; to indemnify the
lessor for claims, damages and losses caused by the lessee's operations; to carry liability in-
surance; and not to assign or sublet the lease without the consent of the lessor. Ross, Coal
and Coal Leases, 1977 REPORT OF SEMINAR ON MINERAL LAW, UNIVERSrY OF KENTUCKY 8-
9 (Oct. 28-29, 1977). Provided the lease contains a forfeiture clause, forfeiture may be had
for the breach of any express covenant.62 If the lease includes a provision for the payment of a minimum royalty, Kentucky
imposes no obligation to mine diligently. The minimum royalty is viewed as the standard
of diligence set by the parties themselves. See Cawood v. Hall Land & Mining Co., 168
S.W.2d 366, 370 (Ky. 1943). This rule, that there is no implied covenant to mine with due
diligence if the lease contains a minimum royalty, governs even if the royalty is a nominal
amount, such as one dollar per acre. See L.E. Cooke Corp. v. Hayes, 549 S.W.2d at 837.
The leases under consideration in that case provided a royalty of twenty-five cents per ton
for every ton of coal mined with a minimum royalty of one dollar per acre per year.
Cooke also stands for the proposition that the lessor may require the lessee to begin
mining, even though the coal lease contains no express or implied covenant to do so. The
court stated:
In the absence of contractual duty relative to cominencing development,
there is no obligation on the part of the lessee to commence the actual oper-
ations unless and until lessors have given sufficient notice demanding the
same within a reasonable time thereafter; and, in addition thereto, if the les-
see fails to comply therewith, the lessor shall then have the right to seek an
end to the contract.
Id. at 839. This demand-for-development rule was first applied to oil and gas leases. As
authority for the rule, the court cited two oil and gas cases: Cameron v. Lebow, 338
S.W.2d at 399, and Monarch Oil, Gas & Coal Co. v. Richardson, 99 S.W. 668 (Ky. 1907).
The court in Cooke was the first to apply the rule to a coal lease.
63 See Bardhill v. Sellers, 298 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1956); Cawood v. Hall Land & Mining
Co., 168 S.W.2d at 366; Eastern Ky. Mineral & Timber Co. v. Swarm-Day Lumber Co.,
146 S.W. at 438; Breckenridge Asphault Co. v. Richardson, 146 S.W. 437 (Ky. 1912).
64 See Moore v. Nickles, 463 S.W.2d 631 (Ky. 1971); Kentucky Rock Asphault Co. v.
Milliner, 27 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. 1930).
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a part of the contract as though it were plainly written therein,"
and courts will declare a forfeiture for breach of it. Two reasons
are generally advanced for imposing these implied convenants.
First, public policy favors the development of mineral re-
sources; 66 if such an obligation is not imposed, this .policy could
be frustrated. Second, with such a lease, the lessor receives noth-
ing unless the lessee actually mines; if the obligation is not im-
posed, the lessee could hold the lease indefinitely to the perpetual
frustration of the lessor. 67 Not only does the lease carry an im-
plied covenant to mine diligently upon breach of which the lease
may be forfeited, but so long as the lease is executory, it may be
cancelled at the option of the lessor.6
6 Cawood v. Hall Land & Mining Co., 168 S.W.2d at 370. Therefore, if the lessor
sues on the basis of the express contract, the written lease, he or she may still have recovery
on the implied obligation. It is only upon implied contracts imposed by the law without
regard to the assent of the party bound that no recovery may be had when the action is
upon an express contract. Id.
66 E.g., Davenport v. Schoenfelt, 229 S.W. 1043 (Ky. 1921). The Court stated:
Our public policy demands progressive development of all our mineral re-
sources, such as oil, gas, coal, and other mineral [sic], and long term leases
held by persons who do not in good faith contemplate early development are
not and should not be countenanced by the courts,.where they hinder or de-
lay the progress of industry.
Id. at 1044.
67 E.g., Killebrew v. Murray, 151 S.W. 662, 667 (Ky. 1912). The Court quoted a
most eloquent expression of this reason from Chauvenet v. Person, 66 A. 855 (Pa. 1907):
Generally, all leases of land for the exploration and development of minerals
are executed by the lessor in the hope and upon the condition, either express
or implied, that the land shall be developed for minerals, and it would be
unjust and unreasonable, and contravene the nature and spirit of the lease,
to allow the lessee to continue to hold under it any considerable length of
time without making any effort at all to develop it according to the express
or implied purpose of the lease; and in general, while equity abhors a forfei-
ture, yet when such forfeiture works equity, and is essential to public and
private interests in the development of minerals in land, the landowner, as
well as the public, will he protected from the laches of the lessee and the for-
feiture of the lease allowed, where such forfeiture does not contravene plain
and unambiguous stipulations in the lease.
151 S.W. at 667.
68 See Berry v. Walton, 366 S.W. 173 (Ky. 1963). The lease under consideration did
not "place on the lessee any express obligation except to account for and pay a royalty on
whatever quantity of material he may remove." Id. In holding that the lease was termin-
able at the will of the lessor, the Court stated that "[e]ven with a specific term, if a party
has given no consideration for a contract under which he is free to perform or not, as he
sees fit, it lacks mutuality and, to the extent that it remains unexecuted, is terminable at
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In order to have a forfeiture declared, the lessor must comply
with certain notice requirements. If seeking forfeiture for the
breach of an express obligation, the lessor must give the lessee
that notice which is required by the terms of the lease.,, This is
merely another manifestation of the rule that the forfeiture
clause will be strictly construed against the party seeking to in-
voke its terms. 70 However, a lease which contained a self-execut-
ing forfeiture clause7' was held not to require any notice by the
lessor as a condition precedent to forfeiture. 72 Generally, a lessor
will want to give notice of an election to forfeit even if such no-
tice is not explicitly required by the lease. 7a For this purpose, it
has been held that the filing of a petition in the circuit court was
sufficient notice of an election to have the lease forfeited. 74
If the lessor seeks forfeiture based on the breach of an implied
covenant to mine with due diligence
the lessor must have put the lessee in default by making def-
inite and unequivocal demand of him that he do so within a
reasonable time, or by giving that character of notice that
compliance with the implied covenant is required. That is a
condition precedent to the maintenance of a suit to forfeit, and
the burden is upon the lessor to prove it.75
the will of the other party." Id. See also Powell v. Ward, 280 S.W. 151, 152-53 (Ky.
1926); Daniel Boone Coal Co. v. Miller, 217 S.W. 666 (Ky. 1920); Soaper v. King, 180
S.W. 46 (Ky. 1915); Killebrew v. Murray, 151 S.W. at 662; Berry v. Frisbie, 86 S.W. 558
(Ky. 1906); L. E. Cooke Corp. v. Hayes, 549 S.W.2d at 837.
69 See, e.g., Casteel v. Heffner, 170 S.W.2d 880 (Ky. 1943); Lowe v. Broad Bottom
Mining Co., 238 S.W. 192 (Ky. 1922).
70 See note 54 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of strict construction of
forfeiture clauses.71 See Marcum v. Brock, 257 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. 1953). The lease merely provided that
upon the failure of the lessee to mine for a period of six months, "then and in that event the
said lease shall become null and void." Id.72 Id. In response to the lessees' argument that the leases had never been declared
null and void or cancelled by the lessors, the Court stated, "It is apparent on the face of the
leases that these provisions for forfeiture are self-executing. Therefore, if [the lessees] failed
to comply with the working condition, they have no more rights thereunder." Id.
73 See notes 78-96 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of possible defenses to
forfeiture by the lessee. If the lessor does not give notice and the lessee continues to work,
the lessor may be held to have waived his right to forfeiture or may be estopped from as-
serting it.
74 Cassidy v. E.M.T. Coal Co., 264 S.W. 744,747 (Ky. 1924).
75 Sapp v. Massey, 358 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Ky. 1962). This case involved an oil and gas
lease, but the rule set out by this Court has been applied to coal leases. See Kentucky Coke
Co. v. Smith, 269 S.W. at 559.
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This rule imposes a rather strict requirement on the lessor. 76 The
lessor must give explicit notice demanding that the lessee com-
mence production within a reasonable time; no other notice will
entitle the lessor to a forfeiture. 7
If the lease contains a forfeiture clause and the lessor believes
that the lessee is not complying with the terms of the agreement,
forfeiture does not automatically follow. The lessee can assert
several defenses. The most obvious defense is compliance With
the terms of the lease. 78 Having failed to comply with such terms,
the lessee may prove that non-performance was due to some con-
tingency beyond his or her control, 79 or that because of the les-
sor's actions, the lessor is not entitled to a forfeiture.10 Equity will
not allow a forfeiture if the lessor: did not give the requisite no-
tice,81 waived his or her right to a forfeiture,8 is estopped from
declaring a forfeiture80 or is barred by laches from asserting a for-
feiture.84
The lessor may waive the right to forfeiture. Essentially, this
is brought about by the lessor's "failure to insist on compliance
7' This may be one reason the lessor, if possible, would want to seek cancellation of
the lease as an executory, unilateral, unenforceable contract. To so cancel, notice need be
given only of the lessor's decision to terminate; no unequivocal demand for production is
required. For a discussion of unenforceable contracts, see note 68 supra and accompany-
ing text.
77 See L.E. Cooke Corp. v. Hayes, 549 S.W.2d at 837. The lessor had sent letters to
the lessee, but the court did "not feel that they in any wise comport[ed] with the definition
of notice as set forth in Cameron v. Lebow." Id. at 839. In the case of Cameron v. Lebow,
338 S.W.2d at 405, the Court imposed a notice requirement identical to that set out in
Sapp v. Massey, 358 S.W.2d 490,492-93 (Ky. 1962).
78 See Carlton v. Kentucky Ridge Coal Co., 112 F. Supp. 371 (E.D. Ky. 1953) (les-
see had paid minimum royalty in accordance with the provisions of the contract).7 9 See Blue Ridge Coal Co. v. Hurst, 244 S.W. at 892. The Court stated that "or-
dinarily a court of equity will relieve against the forfeiture of a contract ... where the
circumstances shown justify such an interposition." Id. at 893. See also Marcum v. Brock,
257 S.W.2d at 56 (lessee must allege performance of the working condition or an excuse
for non-performance).
80 Cf. Bond v. Jackson County Coal Co., 106 F. Supp. 247 (E.D. Ky. 1952) (forfei-
ture allowed as lessee did not prove the elements of estoppel or laches).
81 For a discussion of the requirement of notice, see text accompanying notes 69-77
supra.
82 For a discussion of waiver, see text accompanying notes 85-88 infra.
8 For a discussion of estoppel, see text accompanying notes 89-94 infra.
84 For a discussion of laches, see text accompanying notes 95-96 infra.
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[with the provisions of the agreement and by] continued accep-
tance of royalties under the lease as though all its terms were be-
ing complied with.""s Continued acceptance of royalties is the
most common action which leads to the inference that the lessor
has waived his or her right to forfeiture. A waiver also may be
shown by the conduct and language of the lessor 87 Finally, al-
though forfeiture may be waived for failure to insist upon the
payment of royalties in compliance with the terms of the lease,
such a waiver does not act as a bar to the lessor's right to collect
those royalties. 8
Similar to waiver of forfeiture is the concept that the lessor
may be estopped from asserting a forfeiture. In P. V. & K. Coal
Co. v. Kelly,89 the Court stated:
Equitable estoppel... is the principal [sic] by which a party
who knows or should know the truth is absolutely precluded,
both at law and in equity, from denying, or asserting the con-
trary of, any material fact which, by his words or conduct, af-
firmative or negative, intentionally or through culpable negli-
gence, he has induced another, who was excusably ignorant of
the true facts and who had a right to rely upon such words or
conduct, to believe and act upon them thereby, as a conse-
quence reasonably to be anticipated, changing his position in
such a way that he would suffer injury if such a denial or con-
trary assertion were allowed.90
As to coal leases, estoppel is applied "where it is found that it
would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position
inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced, or of which he ac-
cepted a benefit." 91 Thus, in P. V. & K. Coal Co., the lessors
were estopped from asserting forfeiture even though the lessee
85 Simmerman v. Fort Hartford Coal Co., 221 S.W.2d 442,444 (Ky. 1949).
8M See Litteral v. Spurlock, 253 S.W.2d 236 (Ky. 1952); Sinumerman v. Fort Hart-
ford Coal Co., 221 S.W.2d at 444.
87 See Robinson v. Bailey, 128 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Ky. 1939) (the lessor had full
knowledge and approved of lessee's transfer of lease without required written consent);
Hogg v. Forsythe, 248 S.W. at 1011 (waiver of forfeiture by conduct and language); Staf-
ford v. Pinson, 134 S.W. 909. 910-11 (Ky. 1911) (waiver of forfeiture by conduct).
8 See Criscillis v. Caudill Coal Co., 295 S.W. 1073, 1074 (Ky. 1927).
89 191 S.W.2d 231 (Ky. 1945).
90 Id. at 234 (citing 19 AM. Jur. Estoppel § 19 (1948)).
9' 191 S.W.2d at 234. See Roberts v. Babb, 137 S.W.2d 1112, 1116 (Ky. 1940).
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had not paid the full royalty. Because the lessor did not com-
plain, the lessee expended large sums of money, time and effort
instead of seeking cancellation of the lease. 92 The lessor will not
be estopped from asserting a forfeiture, however, if he or she has
no knowledge that the lessee's acts are inconsistent with the
lease. 93 Also, silence alone does not constitute estoppel.94
Finally, the doctrine of laches may bar the lessor from assert-
ing a forfeiture. As one court stated, laches "contemplates a de-
lay that is unreasonable under the circumstances, during which
period material changes in conditions or the relations of the par-
ties were induced or resulted, and where it would be unjust and
inequitable to the adverse party to disturb the status quo thus
created."' 5 Again, in P. V. & K. Coal Co., the lessors had ac-
cepted the payment from the lessee for more than twenty-five
years. The delay of the lessors in asserting their claim of forfei-
ture gave rise to laches. 16
CONCLUSION
Although in theory a lease may still be abandoned, as a prac-
tical matter, the difficulty of proving the requisite intention se-
verely limits the lessor's ability to have the lease cancelled due to
abandonment. 97 In fact, since 1949, Kentucky's highest court has
not held any coal lease to have been abandoned. m
Because a claim of abandonment is no longer a viable
method of enabling a lessor to regain possession of property, can-
cellation due to forfeiture is the lessor's better means of ensuring
diligent and capable development of his property. But-and it
92 191 S.W.2d at 234.
93 See Buchanan Coal Co. v. Manis, 245 S.W.2d 921,924 (Ky. 1951).
94 Walter Bledsoe & Co. v. Elkhorn Land Co., 219 F.2d at 557.
95 Id. at 559. See Barrowman Coal Corp. v. Kentland Coal & Coke Co., 196 S.W.2d
at 432-34; P. V. & K. Coal Co. v. Kelly, 191 S.W.2d at 233-34.
9' 191 S.W.2d at 233.
97 For a discussion of proof of intent to abandon, see text accompanying notes 13-41
supra.
98 The last decision finding an abandonment was Ellis v. McCormack, 218 S.W.2d
at 391. Cf. Holladay v. Peabody Coal Co., 560 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Ky. 1977) (the Court
held that a coal deed with a reverter clause had not been abandoned despite the failure of
the coal company to mine for more than 30 years).
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cannot be stressed too much-a court will not decree a forfeiture
unless the lease contains a forfeiture clause.o Only rarely has the
Court held that coal leases contain implied covenants.°00 There-
fore, the lessor should insert into the contract those provisions
which are necessary to protect his or her interest. Only by so do-
ing is the coal lessor assured of adequate development of his or
her coal.
Laurance B. VanMeter
9 For a discussion of this requirement, see text accompanying note 51 supra.
100 See notes 62-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of implied covenants. The
only covenant which will be implied into a coal lease (and then only if the lease does not
include a provision for the payment of minimum royalties) is one to mine diligently. See
note 62 supra for a fuller discussion. Oil and gas leases, on the other hand, may contain
several implied covenants. See generally R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF Oi. AND GAS § 8.1
(1971).
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